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Accounting Price of an Exhaustible Resource – Response and Extensions1 
 
Kirk Hamilton and Giovanni Ruta
2
 
 
 
Abstract. Wei (2015) presents a novel derivation of the accounting price for an 
exhaustible resource in a non-optimal economy subject to an allocation mechanism. We 
show that Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta (2009) are in fact employing different and 
mutually exclusive allocation mechanisms for the economy, and this explains the 
differences between the respective accounting prices. Because accounting prices must be 
defined subject to the allocation mechanism for the economy, the prices derived in the 
two papers are equally valid within their respective allocation domains. Further analysis 
shows that if there is declining marginal product of factors, a ‘Hartwick investment rule’ 
for the model economy (set investment just equal to depletion, valued at the accounting 
price) will lead to declining consumption for the Wei (2015) accounting price, and 
increasing consumption for the Hamilton and Ruta (2009) accounting price. This result is 
extended to consider the accounting standards recommended in the UN SEEA(2012), as 
well as accounting for environmental externalities from resource use. 
 
Keywords: exhaustible resource, accounting price, resource depletion, Hartwick Rule, 
environmental externality 
 
JEL codes: Q01 – Q32 – Q53 – Q56  
 
1 Introduction 
 
Hamilton and Ruta (2009) set out a model of a simple extractive economy with the aim of 
establishing the accounting price of an exhaustible resource (this appears in Section 5 of 
their paper). If 𝑆 is a finite stock of an exhaustible resource and 𝑁 is its economic value 
(the present value of the rents generated over the finite lifetime of the resource), then the 
accounting price of the resource is equal to its marginal social value as measured by 
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑆
. 
As Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) show, accounting prices are the key to measuring 
sustainability in a non-optimal economy subject to an allocation mechanism.
3
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 Roughly speaking, an allocation mechanism is an algorithm or set of rules that maps 
initial endowments of assets into a unique future path for the economy. The allocation 
need not be optimal. 
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Wei (2015) offers an alternative way to define the accounting price for this extractive 
economy and suggests that the price derived by Hamilton and Ruta is incorrect. The 
purpose of this note is to show that Hamilton and Ruta (2009) and Wei (2015) are 
employing different and mutually exclusive allocation mechanisms, which explains why 
the accounting prices differ between the two papers. More importantly, this note extends 
the two papers to establish whether the alternative accounting prices can support a 
version of the Hartwick Rule (Hartwick 1977) in the non-optimal extractive economy. 
Comparisons with the accounting standard established in the UN System of 
Environmental-Economic Account (SEEA 2012) are derived, as well as an extension of 
SEEA (2012) to deal with pollution externalities. 
 
We first clarify the allocation mechanisms in Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta (2009). 
Section 3 explores the Hartwick Rule under the alternative assumptions made in the two 
papers. Section 4 relates Hamilton’s (2015) analysis of the SEEA (2012) to the 
measurement of sustainability in Hamilton and Ruta (2009), and extends the analysis to 
include a pollution externality. The final section concludes. 
 
2 Alternative allocation mechanisms 
 
For an extractive economy with initial stocks of produced assets 𝐾(0) and exhaustible 
resource 𝑆(0), an allocation mechanism 𝛼 defines a mapping 
 
𝛼: {𝐾(0), 𝑆(0)} → {𝐾(𝑡), 𝑆(𝑡), 𝑅(𝑡), 𝐶(𝑡)}𝑡=0
∞   
 
Over this possibly infinite time horizon the paths of produced capital 𝐾, resource stock 𝑆, 
resource extraction 𝑅 and consumption 𝐶 are uniquely defined by 𝛼.4 The allocation 
mechanism is feasible if 𝐾(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑆(𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀𝑡. 
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 3 
To make this more concrete, it is useful to take a subset of 𝛼 that concerns only the 
evolution of the resource stock and its economic value 𝑁. The basic accounting rule for 
the resource is, 
 
?̇? = −𝑅  (1) 
 
In Wei (2015) the allocation mechanism 𝛼𝑊 given resource stock 𝑆(𝑡) consists of: 
 
(W1) Choose an extraction path such that 𝑅(𝑡) = ?̅?𝑊 is constant 
(W2) Assume that the unit resource rent is also constant, 𝑛(𝑡) = ?̅?𝑊 
 
Under these assumptions it follows, as shown in Wei (2015), that the date of exhaustion 
𝑇 of the resource stock is a function of 𝑆(𝑡) given by, 
 
𝑇(𝑆(𝑡)) =
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑅𝑊̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
+ 𝑡  (2) 
 
and the value of the resource stock, given constant discount rate 𝑟 is, 
 
𝑁𝑊 = ∫ ?̅?𝑊?̅?𝑊 ⋅ 𝑒−𝑟(𝑧−𝑡)𝑑𝑧
𝑇(𝑆(𝑡))
𝑡
  (3) 
 
As Wei establishes, under this allocation mechanism the accounting price is measured as, 
 
𝑞 ≡
𝜕𝑁𝑊
𝜕𝑆
= ?̅?𝑊 ⋅ 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇(𝑆(𝑡))−𝑡)   (4) 
 
In Hamilton and Ruta (2009) the allocation mechanism 𝛼𝐻𝑅 given resource stock 𝑆(𝑡) is 
defined as, 
 
(HR1) Choose a fixed exhaustion time 𝑇 
(HR2) Choose constant ?̅?𝐻𝑅 to satisfy 𝑆(𝑡) = ∫ ?̅?𝐻𝑅𝑑𝑧
𝑇
𝑡
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(HR3) Assume a constant unit resource rent 𝑛(𝑡) = ?̅?𝐻𝑅 
 
From assumption (HR2) it follows that 
 
?̅?𝐻𝑅 =
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑇−𝑡
 (5) 
 
Under these assumptions the value of the resource stock is 
 
𝑁𝐻𝑅 = ∫ ?̅?𝐻𝑅?̅?𝐻𝑅 ⋅ 𝑒−𝑟(𝑧−𝑡)𝑑𝑧
𝑇
𝑡
= ?̅?𝐻𝑅 ⋅
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑇−𝑡
⋅ ∫ 𝑒−𝑟(𝑧−𝑡)𝑑𝑧
𝑇
𝑡
  (6) 
 
As Hamilton and Ruta show, the accounting price under this allocation mechanism is 
 
𝑝 ≡
𝜕𝑁𝐻𝑅
𝜕𝑆
=
?̅?𝐻𝑅
𝑇−𝑡
⋅
1
𝑟
⋅ (1 − 𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)) (7) 
 
As expressions (3) and (6) show, the effect of the alternative allocation methods is to 
make the resource value 𝑁 an explicit function of the resource stock 𝑆. 
 
It is worth exploring the intuition behind these results for alternative accounting prices. 
Under 𝛼𝑊 an increment to the resource stock ∆𝑆 must result in an extension of the 
exhaustion date to 𝑇(𝑆(𝑡)) + ∆𝑇, owing to the fixed quantity of resource extraction at 
each point in time (W1). The result is that the change in resource value ∆𝑁 is effectively 
the present value of the last unit of the resource extracted – this is the interpretation of 
accounting price 𝑞 as seen in expression (4). Conversely, under 𝛼𝐻𝑅 the exhaustion date 
is fixed (HR1). As a result a small increment ∆𝑆 in the resource stock does not affect the 
accounting price 𝑝 (expression 7) and the change in the value of the stock is given by 
∆𝑁 = 𝑝∆𝑆. 
 
As should be clear, these allocation mechanisms are mutually exclusive. You either 
choose a fixed quantity of extraction at the outset, which makes the exhaustion time a 
function of the stock of resource (Wei), or you choose a fixed exhaustion time at the 
 5 
outset, which makes the fixed quantity extracted a function of the stock of resource 
(Hamilton and Ruta). 
 
As should also be clear, if both allocation mechanisms use the same constant unit rent, 
say ?̅?, then it is possible to choose extraction ?̅? = ?̅?𝑊 = ?̅?𝐻𝑅 such that the exhaustion 
time is 𝑇 =
𝑆(𝑡)
?̅?𝑊
+ 𝑡. In this case the value of the resource stock is the same under either 
approach, 𝑁𝑊 = 𝑁𝐻𝑅, but the two accounting prices 𝑞 and 𝑝 are still distinct because 
they are defined subject to their corresponding allocation mechanisms. 
 
Assuming equal values of the resource stock under each approach permits us to analyze 
the relationship between the two accounting prices. For Wei (2015) we have, 
 
𝑞?̇? = −𝑞𝑅 = ?̇?  (8) 
 
𝑞𝑆 = ?̇? ⋅ (𝑇(𝑆(𝑡)) − 𝑡)  (9) 
 
For Hamilton and Ruta (2009) we have, 
 
𝑝𝑆 = 𝑁  (10) 
 
𝑝?̇? + ?̇?𝑆 = ?̇?  (11) 
 
Combining expressions (8) and (11) we derive, 
 
𝑝 = 𝑞 +
?̇?𝑆
?̅?
 (12) 
 
Expression (8) is derived in Wei (2015), while expression (11) is derived in Hamilton and 
Ruta (2009). As expressions (8) and (9) suggest, accounting price 𝑞 only gives 
economically meaningful values when multiplied by a flow rather than a stock. 
Expression (11) embodies both the real change in resource wealth defined by Hamilton 
 6 
and Ruta, 𝑝?̇? = −𝑝𝑅, and the corresponding capital gain linked to resource extraction, 
?̇?𝑆. Expression (12) is particularly helpful, because it says that the Hamilton and Ruta 
accounting price 𝑝 is equal to the Wei accounting price 𝑞 plus the capital gain per unit of 
extraction. 
 
It is worth noting that in valuing exhaustible resources, national accountants generally 
calculate running averages for recent annual quantities of resource extracted and forecast 
that the most recent average is the constant quantity that will be extracted up to the point 
of exhaustion of the resource. The time to exhaustion 𝑇 − 𝑡 is then calculated as the ratio 
of economic reserves to the forecast annual quantity extracted. This approach 
notwithstanding, the implication of the foregoing analysis is that the accountant must 
assume either that the quantity extracted is fixed or that the terminal date is fixed in 
determining the accounting price for the resource. The next section shows that this choice 
has important consequences when applying policies for sustainability in an extractive 
economy. 
 
3 Alternative implementations of the Hartwick Rule 
 
Hartwick (1977) establishes that a closed extractive economy with fixed technology, 
constant population and a finite resource that is a necessary input to production can enjoy 
constant consumption over an infinite horizon if investment in produced capital just 
equals the value of resource depletion at each point in time.
5
 The economy is sustainable 
under this rule. In the Hartwick model, resource depletion equals the marginal rental 
value of the resource, and the marginal rental rate is assumed to increase at the rate of 
interest (the Hotelling Rule). 
 
Here we wish to explore the obvious generalization of the Hartwick Rule to the models of 
Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta (2009). The basic idea is to set investment in 
                                                 
5
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resource must be equal to 1 in the Hartwick (1977) model, and the elasticity of output 
with respect to produced capital must be greater than the elasticity for the resource. 
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produced capital equal to the value of resource depletion derived from the respective 
allocation mechanisms.
6
 We generalize the models to an economy with a neoclassical 
production function such that, 
 
𝐹(𝐾, 𝑅) = 𝐶 + ?̇? + 𝑓(𝑅) (13) 
 
𝐹𝐾 > 0, 𝐹𝐾𝐾 < 0, 𝐹𝑅 > 0, 𝐹𝑅𝑅 < 0 (14) 
 
The production function exhibits declining marginal product with respect to factors, and 
𝑓(𝑅) is the extraction cost function for the resource. The interest rate 𝐹𝐾 is not assumed 
to be constant over time, which has implications for the results which follow. First, the 
general expression for the value of the resource stock becomes, 
 
𝑁 = ?̅??̅? ⋅ ∫ 𝑒− ∫ 𝐹𝐾(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
𝑧
𝑇
𝑡
𝑑𝑥  (15) 
 
Under Wei’s allocation mechanism the accounting price is therefore, 
 
𝑞 = ?̅?𝑒− ∫ 𝐹𝐾(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑇(𝑆(𝑡))
𝑡   
 
Under Hamilton and Ruta’s allocation mechanism the accounting price is, 
 
𝑝 =
?̅?
𝑇−𝑡
⋅
1
𝐹𝐾(𝑡)
⋅ (1 − 𝑒− ∫ 𝐹𝐾(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑇
𝑡 )  
 
Finally, from expression (15) we derive the instantaneous change in the value of the 
resource stock as a result of resource extraction, 
 
?̇? = −?̅??̅? ⋅ 𝑒− ∫ 𝐹𝐾(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑇
𝑡   (16) 
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We can now extend the analysis in the preceding section by introducing a “Hartwick 
investment rule” into the allocation mechanisms of Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta 
(2009). Expression (13) indicates that output can be consumed, invested or spent on 
resource extraction. Since allocation rules W1 and HR2 specify the path for resource 
extraction, they determine extraction costs 𝑓(𝑅).  The introduction of an investment rule 
into the respective allocation mechanisms therefore determines the future path of 
consumption, yielding a unique future path for the economy as a whole. 
 
For the model of Wei the investment rule is 
 
(W3) ?̇? = 𝑞?̅? = −?̇? 
 
Since ?̅? is assumed to be constant (W1), it follows from expression (13) that, 
 
?̈? = 𝐹𝐾?̇? − ?̇? = −
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
(?̇?) = −
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
(𝐹𝐾𝑁 − ?̅??̅?) = −?̇?𝐾𝑁 − 𝐹𝐾?̇?  
 
And therefore, substituting (W3), 
 
?̇? = ?̇?𝐾𝑁 (17) 
 
For the model of Hamilton and Ruta the investment rule is 
 
(HR4) ?̇? = 𝑝?̅? =
𝑁
𝑆
⋅ ?̅? 
 
From (HR4) we have 
 
?̈? =
?̇?𝑆+𝑁?̅?
𝑆𝑠
⋅ ?̅? =
𝐹𝐾𝑁−?̅??̅?𝑆+𝑁?̅?
𝑆2
⋅ ?̅?  
 
Given ?̅? constant (HR2), it follows that, 
 9 
 
?̇? = 𝐹𝐾?̇? − ?̈? = 𝐹𝐾
𝑁
𝑆
⋅ ?̅? −
𝐹𝐾𝑁−?̅??̅?𝑆+𝑁?̅?
𝑆2
⋅ ?̅?  
 
Collecting terms this reduces to, 
 
?̇? = (?̅?𝑆 − 𝑁) ⋅
?̅?2
𝑆2
 (18) 
 
The result for the Wei allocation mechanism, expression (17), is negative under the 
assumption of declining marginal product of factors.
7
 Investing 𝑞?̅? at each point in time 
results in declining consumption. Conversely, since ?̅?𝑆 is the undiscounted value of 
resource flows over the life of the resource, and 𝑁 is the discounted present value of these 
resource flows, expression (18) establishes that the Hamilton and Ruta allocation 
mechanism yields growing consumption at each point in time. 
 
4 Extensions: the UN SEEA (2012) and externalities from resource use 
 
Having established how the Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta (2009) models perform 
under a Hartwick investment rule, these results can be made more general by considering 
how the Hamilton and Ruta model relates to the System of Environmental-Economic 
Accounting (SEEA 2012). A further extension analyzes how to account for an 
environmental externality from resource use, combining the assumptions of fixed 
exhaustion time 𝑇 and constant resource extraction ?̅? with SEEA (2012) accounting 
conventions. 
 
An important step in standardizing environmental and resource accounting practice was 
the adoption of the SEEA (2012) as a UN statistical standard. Hamilton (2015) analyzes 
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 To be precise, (W3) implies that ?̇? > 0 since ?̇? < 0 (expression 16), and so ?̇?𝐾 =
𝐹𝐾𝐾?̇? < 0. 
 10 
the application of SEEA (2012) to the problem of measuring the sustainability of 
development, using the generalized Hartwick rule of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005).
8
 
 
Expression (10) above implies that the unit value of depletion of an exhaustible resource 
in Hamilton and Ruta (2009) is given by 𝑝 ≡
𝑁
𝑆
. This corresponds exactly to the standard 
set out in SEEA (2012), and so it is useful to compare the measurement of sustainability 
presented in section 3 to that derived in Hamilton (2015) for the SEEA. There are two 
differences between the models of Hamilton and Ruta (2009) and Hamilton (2015). First, 
Hamilton (2015) assumes that resource extraction declines at a constant rate, 
?̇?
𝑅
= −𝜙; 
this compares with the constant level of extraction ?̅? associated with a fixed exhaustion 
time 𝑇 in Hamilton and Ruta. Second, Hamilton (2015) assumes that marginal resource 
extraction costs are constant, which implies that unit rents will vary with the resource 
price 𝐹𝑅; Hamilton and Ruta assume that unit rents ?̅? are constant. 
 
Hamilton (2015) shows that, given the assumptions about declining extraction and 
constant marginal extraction costs, setting genuine saving 𝐺 ≡ ?̇? − 𝑝𝑅 equal to 0 (the 
standard Hartwick Rule) implies that consumption is instantaneously constant. If, instead, 
there are increasing marginal resource extraction costs then the standard Hartwick Rule 
implies that ?̇? is proportional to the (positive) inframarginal rents on extraction; the 
standard Hartwick Rule implies increasing consumption in this instance. 
 
Expression (18) above shows that the standard Hartwick Rule in the Hamilton and Ruta 
(2009) model also implies increasing consumption. An important advantage evident in 
expression (18), however, is that it is simple to measure the amount by which 
consumption increases under the standard Hartwick Rule. In contrast, to measure this 
increase in the Hamilton (2015) model with increasing marginal extraction costs requires 
                                                 
8
 Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) derive a generalized Hartwick Rule, showing that 
?̇? = 𝐹𝐾𝐺 − ?̇? for genuine saving 𝐺. The standard Hartwick Rule is a special case for 
𝐺 = ?̇? = 0; a path where genuine saving is identically 0 at each point in time will exhibit 
constant consumption. 
 11 
specification of the extraction cost function, knowledge that may not be forthcoming in 
many circumstances. 
 
An environmental externality from resource use 
 
If we assume that healthfulness 𝐻 is a stock that contributes to wellbeing, then utility can 
be measured as 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐻). In what follows we examine the question of measuring 
sustainability using SEEA (2012) conventions when extraction of the resource leads to 
health damage measured as 𝑑(?̅?); formally, 𝑑(?̅?) is represented as a deduction from the 
stock of health 𝐻, while extraction ?̅? is held constant for an assumed exhaustion date 𝑇. 
 
The optimal growth problem is to maximize 
 
𝑉 = ∫ 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐻) ⋅
𝑇
𝑡
𝑒−𝜌(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠  (19) 
 
subject to accounting identity (13) and the following: 
 
?̇? = −𝑑(?̅?)  (20) 
?̇? = −?̅?  (21) 
 
If we think of local air pollution as an example of an externality associated with use of 
the resource in production, then 𝑑(?̅?) encompasses the whole sequence from resource 
use to pollutant emission, dispersion, and human exposure, finally resulting in damage to 
health. In what follows we make the simplifying assumption that the marginal extraction 
cost for the resource 𝑓′ is constant, as is the marginal health damage from resource use 
𝑑′.9 We therefore relax the assumption of constant unit resource rents in Wei (2015) and 
Hamilton and Ruta (2009). 
 
                                                 
9
 This simplification is not necessary, but it streamlines the derivation of the main results. 
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The basic growth theory leading to the expression for genuine saving in an optimal 
extractive economy with a pollution externality is derived in the Annex. Taking the 
results for the optimal economy as a model, we derive the generalized Hartwick Rule for 
the non-optimal economy under the assumptions of constant resource extraction and 
SEEA accounting conventions for measuring resource depletion.  
 
A key parameter derived in the Annex is 𝑧, the shadow price of a unit of health damage, 
which equals the present value of the instantaneous willingness to pay for a unit of 
healthfulness 𝑈𝐻/𝑈𝐶, as seen in Annex expression (A4). Because of the externality, the 
shadow price of the resource has to include the value of marginal damage to health from 
resource use, as seen in the Annex expression (A3). Because marginal extraction costs 
and marginal health damages are constant, the value of the resource stock 𝑁 is equal to 
the present value of net resource rents, 
 
𝑁 = ∫ (𝐹𝑅 − 𝑓
′ − 𝑧𝑑′)?̅? ⋅ 𝑒− ∫ 𝐹𝐾(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
𝑧
𝑇
𝑡
𝑑𝑧  
 
This corresponds to expression (15) in section 3. Genuine saving in this economy is given 
by, 
 
𝐺 ≡ ?̇? − 𝑝𝑅 − 𝑧𝑑  (22) 
 
That is, net saving equals investment in produced capital, minus depletion of the resource 
stock, minus the value of damage to the stock of health from the pollution externality. 
Here 𝑝 ≡ 𝑁/𝑆, per SEEA (2012) conventions. The generalized Hartwick Rule is derived 
as follows: 
 
?̇? = ?̈? − ?̇?𝑑 − ?̇??̅?  
    = 𝐹𝐾?̇? − ?̇? − (𝐹𝐾𝑧 −
𝑈𝐻
𝑈𝐶
) 𝑑 − (𝐹𝐾𝑝 − (𝐹𝑅 − 𝑓
′ − 𝑧𝑑′))
𝑅
𝑆
+ 𝑁
𝑅
𝑆2
  
 
𝐹𝐾𝐺 = 𝐹𝐾?̇? − 𝐹𝐾𝑝𝑅 − 𝐹𝐾𝑧𝑑  
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Collecting terms as in section 3 yields the generalized Hartwick rule: 
 
?̇? −
𝑈𝐻
𝑈𝐶
𝑑 = 𝐹𝐾𝐺 − ?̇? + ((𝐹𝑅 − 𝑓
′ − 𝑧𝑑′)𝑆 − 𝑁)
𝑅2
𝑆2
  (23) 
 
In this expression ?̇? −
𝑈𝐻
𝑈𝐶
𝑑 is the dollar-valued instantaneous change in wellbeing (taking 
account of the health damages from resource use). The term ((𝐹𝑅 − 𝑓
′ − 𝑧𝑑′)𝑆 − 𝑁) is 
the difference between the value of the resource stock in the optimal economy
10
 and 𝑁, 
which is the value of the resource stock in the non-optimal economy being modeled. The 
final term in expression (23) is therefore positive. Under the standard Hartwick Rule 
(𝐺 = ?̇? = 0) wellbeing is therefore increasing, closely paralleling section 3 with the 
exception that the health externality has to be included. If genuine saving is non-negative 
and growing at a rate less than the interest rate 𝐹𝐾 at each point in time, then wellbeing is 
everywhere increasing, which implies that social welfare 𝑉 is also everywhere increasing. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
Wei’s (2015) contribution to the literature is to show that there is an alternative allocation 
mechanism that can be applied to the model economy of Hamilton and Ruta (2009), and 
that this mechanism leads to a novel accounting price for the resource. The foregoing 
analysis shows that the allocation mechanisms employed in each paper are distinct and 
the accounting prices derived are equally valid within the domain defined by their 
respective allocation mechanisms. In this response we have derived the relationship 
between the accounting prices in the two papers. 
 
Neither Wei (2015) nor Hamilton and Ruta (2009) go on to establish the behavior of the 
economy under a “Hartwick investment rule” derived from their respective accounting 
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 Recall that the Hotelling rule, expression (A3), applies in the optimal economy. As a 
result the growth in unit rents is completely offset by the discount rate. 
 14 
prices for the resource. This response to Wei fills the gap by showing that, under standard 
assumptions regarding declining marginal product of factors, the Wei accounting price 
results in declining consumption at each point in time, while the Hamilton and Ruta 
accounting price leads to increasing consumption. If the policy goal for the economy is to 
achieve constant consumption, then the Wei approach is clearly under-investing while the 
Hamilton and Ruta approach is over-investing. If the policy goal is non-declining 
consumption at each point in time, then the Hamilton and Ruta approach is a sufficient 
condition to reach the goal. 
 
Looking forward, it is clear that much more rigor is required in the application of 
Dasgupta and Mäler’s (2000) concept of accounting prices for assets. In particular, it 
needs to be made clear for models such as the above that 
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑆
≡
𝜕
𝜕𝑆
𝑁(𝑆; 𝛼). That is, 
accounting prices can only be measured with respect to the assumed allocation 
mechanism 𝛼. And 𝛼 needs to be fully specified. 
 
We also show that the Hamilton and Ruta (2009) model of extraction implicitly employs 
the valuation of resource depletion adopted in SEEA (2012). As a result, there are strong 
parallels between the standard Hartwick Rule, derived using the Hamilton and Ruta 
(2009) assumptions, and the Hamilton (2015) analysis of the standard Hartwick Rule 
using SEEA (2012) accounting conventions. 
 
If resource use results in health damages (for example from pollution emissions), then we 
show that under SEEA (2012) accounting conventions the generalized Hartwick Rule has 
to account both for instantaneous health damages and the reduction in resource rents 
resulting from the persistent loss of healthfulness associated with resource use. In this 
model the standard Hartwick Rule leads to increasing wellbeing. 
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Annex. Optimal resource extraction with a health externality 
 
For health stock 𝐻, health damage function 𝑑(𝑅), utility 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐻) and accumulation 
equations (13), (20) and (21), the objective is to maximize, 
 
𝑉 = ∫ 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐻) ⋅
𝑇
𝑡
𝑒−𝜌(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠  (A1) 
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for constant pure rate of time preference 𝜌. The Hamiltonian function is given by, 
 
ℋ = 𝑈 + 𝛾1?̇? + 𝛾2?̇? + 𝛾3?̇?  
 
where the 𝛾𝑖 are the corresponding shadow prices. From the first order condition on 
consumption (
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
= 0) it follows that 𝛾1 = 𝑈𝐶, while the dynamic first order condition 
(?̇?1 = 𝜌𝛾1 −
𝜕ℋ
𝜕𝐾
) on ?̇?𝐶 yields the standard Ramsey equation, 
 
𝐹𝐾 = 𝜌 − (
?̇?𝐶
𝑈𝐶
)  (A2) 
 
Defining 𝛾2 ≡ 𝑈𝐶𝑧, where 𝑧 is the value of a unit of the health stock 𝐻, the first order 
condition on extraction yields, 
 
𝛾3 = 𝑈𝐶(𝐹𝑅 − 𝑓
′ − 𝑧𝑑′)  
 
The dynamic first order condition for ?̇?3 therefore gives the Hotelling rule for this 
economy, 
 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
(𝐹𝑅−𝑓
′−𝑧𝑑′)
𝐹𝑅−𝑓′−𝑧𝑑′
= 𝐹𝐾  (A3) 
 
Marginal rents on extraction therefore deduct the marginal damage to health 𝑧𝑑′. Next, 
the dyamic first order condition on ?̇?2 gives, 
 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
(𝑈𝐶𝑧) = 𝜌𝑈𝐶𝑧 − 𝑈𝐻  
 
and substituting (A2) yields, 
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?̇? = 𝐹𝐾𝑧 −
𝑈𝐻
𝑈𝐶
  
 
This differential equation has solution, 
 
 
𝑧 = ∫
𝑈𝐻
𝑈𝐶
(𝑠) ⋅ 𝑒− ∫ 𝐹𝐾(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑠
𝑡 𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑡
  (A4) 
 
Genuine saving 𝐺 is therefore derived from the Hamiltonian function as, 
 
𝐺 = ?̇? − 𝑧𝑑(𝑅) − (𝐹𝑅 − 𝑓
′ − 𝑧𝑑′)𝑅  (A5) 
 
 
